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Introduction
The recent global financial crisis was accompanied by a marked
fall in the flow of new bank loans to UK businesses and
households (Chart 1), and lending has remained subdued even
as economic activity has begun to recover.  Weaker bank
lending is likely to reflect both a tightening in the supply of
credit and an easing in the demand for credit.  This article
reviews the available evidence on the relative importance of
each of these factors in explaining the weakness of bank
lending.  
The global financial crisis began in mid-2007, triggered by
emerging losses in the US sub-prime mortgage market.  As the
financial crisis intensified, the funding costs of lenders in the
United Kingdom rose markedly relative to Bank Rate.  That
made it more expensive for them to fund the loans and
facilities to which they were already committed and
discouraged new lending.  
The financial crisis also exposed other systemic
vulnerabilities,(2) and the resulting adjustment in the 
banking system took several forms.  Some financial 
institutions raised equity and sold assets.  Banks both in the
United Kingdom and abroad tightened credit conditions.  
And some foreign lenders withdrew from lending in the 
United Kingdom.(3)
Alongside the tightening in the supply of credit, a number of
factors are likely to have weighed on the demand for loans
during the financial crisis.  Some of these may have been a
direct or indirect consequence of tighter credit supply
conditions, and some may have occurred independently.
Companies may have scaled back or postponed investment
plans, and therefore their demand for finance, in part reflecting
increased spare capacity, a reduction in expected demand for
their products or greater uncertainty about the economic
outlook.  Some households may have scaled back spending
due to concerns over job losses, or expectations of lower pay
growth.  The economic downturn may also have encouraged
both households and companies to revise down the levels of
debt that they wished to hold.
But, in the opposite direction, other factors may have
bolstered credit demand.  Monetary policy was loosened
markedly between mid-2007 and late 2009, and Bank Rate
remains at 0.5%.  Lower interest rates increase the incentive to
consume or invest today, which, for some households, would
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Chart 1 Quarterly flow of net lending to UK households
and businesses(a)
(a) Lending to individuals and M4 lending (excluding securitisations) to private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs).312 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
increase their demand for credit.  In addition, some households
may borrow to smooth out consumption in the face of
temporary weakness in income.  Similarly, some businesses
may have needed more day-to-day finance (sometimes
referred to as ‘working capital’ finance) as short-term cash
flow came under pressure from strains along their supply
chains.
Identifying the relative contribution of tight credit supply and
weak credit demand to the weakness in lending is important
for monetary policy.  To the extent that weak bank lending
reflects tight supply rather than weak demand, then weak
lending is more likely to dampen the recovery in activity.  For
example, an increase in the cost of credit would push down
investment spending.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows.  First, it
discusses the issues around identifying changes in credit
demand and credit supply in principle.  Second, it takes several
different approaches to assess the extent to which changes in
credit supply and demand have contributed to the weakness in
bank lending. 
Identifying changes in credit demand and
supply
Disentangling the impacts of changes in the demand for and
the supply of credit is difficult.  Only the cost of borrowing and
the quantity advanced are directly observable.  And lenders
only observe demand for credit given the rates and other terms
and conditions on the products that they make available.
Similarly, borrowers only report their demand given the cost
and availability of products. 
Simple economic theory can help to assess how the cost and
quantity of bank lending would be expected to change given
movements in credit demand and supply.  In a simple
framework, where the quality of potential borrowers is
assumed to be fixed, credit demand and credit supply are
related to a measure of the cost of credit (for example, the
interest rate spread on loans relative to Bank Rate).  The higher
the cost of credit, the less willing people will be to ask for
credit, but the more willing institutions will be to provide it.
In this simple framework, prices move to bring demand and
supply into balance.  As such, when the amount of credit
advanced falls, it must ultimately be because both the amount
of credit demanded and supplied have fallen.  For example, if
there is a reduction in banks’ willingness to lend, prices will rise
so as to choke off demand and bring the market back into
balance.  The identification issue in explaining the weakness of
bank lending is not whether supply or demand have fallen —
both have — but it is assessing the underlying cause of that
decline, whether it is an independent tightening in the supply
of credit, an independent fall in credit demand, or some
combination of both.
Figure 1 illustrates a tightening in the supply of credit
(represented by a leftward shift in the supply curve from ‘loose
supply’ to ‘tight supply’), consistent with the definition of a
credit supply shock used by Bernanke and Lown (1991).(1) Such
a tightening in credit supply could reflect a number of factors,
including an increase in banks’ funding costs relative to 
Bank Rate, or a reduction in risk appetite.  Figure 1 suggests
that a reduction in the supply of credit would result in an
increase in the cost of credit and a reduction in the quantity of
bank lending.  Following the shift in credit supply, lenders
would observe weaker credit demand, as borrowers shift along
their credit demand schedule, but that would reflect the
tightening in credit supply and hence the movement to the
new equilibrium, rather than an independent shift in overall
credit demand.
The sensitivity of credit demand to changes in its cost —
known as the elasticity of demand — influences the extent to
which the price and quantity of lending adjusts.  The elasticity
of demand reflects a number of factors, including the
alternative sources of finance available.  For example, large
companies have more alternative sources of finance than small
companies and households, so their demand is likely to be
more sensitive to changes in credit supply than that of small
companies or households.  And the increase in the cost of
issuing corporate bonds — an alternative source of finance for
large companies — during the crisis would also have boosted
the demand for bank credit at any given spread.
Figure 2 illustrates how an independent reduction in demand
for credit (represented by a downward shift in the demand
curve from ‘high demand’ to ‘low demand’) would result in a 
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Figure 1 Illustration of a tightening in credit supply
(1) The Bernanke-Lown (1991) definition of a credit crunch is:  a significant leftward shift
in the supply curve for bank loans, holding constant both the safe real rate of interest
and the quality of potential borrowers.  Research and analysis Understanding the weakness of bank lending 313
reduction in the quantity of bank lending, and a reduction in
the cost of credit.  The sensitivity of credit supply to changes in
the demand for credit would influence the price and quantity
of lending in the new equilibrium.
The strength of this simple framework is that it gives a clear
picture.  But the real world is inevitably more complicated.  For
example, in practice, the quality of potential borrowers
changes over time, and that can affect the interpretation of a
change in loan spreads.  On the one hand, if the quality of
borrowers deteriorates, as is likely to have happened during
the financial crisis, lenders would require a higher spread to
compensate them for the increased risk associated with
lending.  That could be misinterpreted as a credit supply shock,
which would overstate the extent to which weak bank lending
reflects a genuine tightening in credit supply.  On the other
hand, lenders might restrict credit supply by tightening 
non-price terms and conditions to improve the quality of
borrowers that are granted credit.  The resulting reduction in
loan spreads could be misinterpreted as a reduction in loan
demand or a loosening in the supply of credit.  So it is
important to control, insofar as possible, for changes in the
quality of borrowers and borrowing terms in making an
assessment about the drivers of the weakness of bank lending.  
The overall demand for credit is likely to be influenced by other
factors in addition to the spreads on loans relative to risk-free
rates.  For example, overall demand for credit is likely to be a
function of total borrowing costs, among other things, rather
than just the spread relative to Bank Rate as drawn in the
simplified example.  During the financial crisis, falls in 
Bank Rate would have boosted demand for credit for any given
spread, working against the impact of any other weakening in
credit demand.  Demand for credit is also likely to be affected
by expectations of the future cost and availability of credit,
reflecting the long-term nature of financing needs.  When
taking out a mortgage, households’ expectations of future
spreads and Bank Rate will influence their current demand for
credit.  And companies’ borrowing decisions are likely to be
influenced by the likelihood that loan facilities will be renewed
in the future.
Second-round effects further complicate the identification of
changes in credit demand and supply.  For example, when
businesses cancel their expansion plans because they cannot
obtain a loan, credit demand from the suppliers of those
businesses may also be weaker.  To the extent that such
second-round effects have been important, a simple analysis
would tend to underestimate the size of the underlying shock
to credit supply, and attribute more of any weakening in
lending to an independent shift in credit demand. 
Nonetheless, this simple framework can help to identify credit
demand and supply shocks.  As this article goes on to discuss,
the weakness of bank lending has been associated with higher
spreads (as in Figure 1), rather than lower spreads (as in 
Figure 2).  That suggests that a tightening in credit supply is
likely to be a significant part of the explanation for weak bank
lending during the recession following the financial crisis.  It is
not possible to say, using this simple framework, whether there
have been independent shifts in credit demand as well. 
Evidence on credit supply and credit demand 
This section discusses evidence on changes in credit supply and
demand using five approaches.  First, using evidence on the
price and availability of loans to households and companies.
Second, evidence from the lenders is examined.  Third,
evidence from business surveys and reports from the Bank’s
Agents is used.  Fourth, information on the price and quantity
of non-bank finance is scrutinised.  Finally, the article discusses
the results from an econometric identification of credit supply
and demand shocks.
Price and availability of bank credit
Assessing the extent to which credit conditions have changed
without a detailed investigation of data on individual loans is
necessarily imperfect.  Nevertheless, this section brings
together the available evidence in order to assess the
contribution made by tighter credit supply to the rise in the
relative cost of credit and the reduction in availability during
the financial crisis.(1)
Households
Spreads on bank credit to households rose during the financial
crisis, and the availability of loans tightened.  Spreads
increased between mid-2008 and early 2009, and have
remained high (Chart 2).  Increases were most marked for
relatively risky loans, such as unsecured lending.  But spreads
rose on mortgages obtained with even a 25% deposit.  Credit
availability also fell, particularly for those with little equity
built up in property on which to secure their loans.  While
Spread to Bank Rate
Quantity of bank loans 
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Figure 2 Illustration of a weakening in credit demand
(1) For a discussion of recent developments in credit conditions, see Section 1.3 in the
November 2010 Inflation Report.314 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
loans of up to 90%–95% of the value of the property (LTV) —
and some products with LTVs in excess of 100% — were
common in the few years preceding the financial crisis, the
number of products with LTVs in excess of 85% dropped to a
fraction of its pre-crisis level by mid-2009, and has remained
low (Chart 3).  In part, the tightening in credit conditions is
likely to have been in response to the unusually loose
conditions immediately prior to the crisis.
The loan pricing framework set out in Button et al (2010) can
be used to assess the factors driving higher spreads.  Their
analysis shows that higher bank funding costs and residual
items such as the mark-up or operating costs on a 75% LTV
mortgage together have increased by around 2.5 percentage
points compared to pre-crisis averages (Table A).  The
equivalent increase in spreads on unsecured personal loans has
been over 6 percentage points.
That loan pricing decomposition suggests that the bulk of the
increase in spreads since mid-2007 reflects tighter credit
supply.  Although perceived credit quality — identified as an
increase in credit risk factors in Table A — has deteriorated
over this period for unsecured borrowing, that appears to have
made a relatively small contribution to increased spreads.  If
lenders had reduced spreads in response to weak demand, that
would have pushed down the residual components of loan
prices, while tighter supply would have pushed up the residual
components.  Although there may be other unmodelled
factors affecting the residual components, the residuals have
increased markedly since 2008 (Table A), suggesting that
tighter credit supply is likely to have been more important
than weaker credit demand.
Businesses 
Measuring the impact of tighter credit supply on the cost of
bank finance to businesses is harder than it is for households.
First, there are no comprehensive data on quoted interest rates
on new loans split by credit quality.  The alternative — average
lending rate data — will reflect changes in the quality of loans.
Second, there is no clear distinction in the available data
between interest rates on new and existing loans:  for some
lenders, new business includes companies drawing down
existing facilities with pre-arranged costs, or loans that have
been repriced in line with changes in reference rates.
Reflecting both of these factors, and given that existing
facilities are likely to have had lower spreads than those on
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Chart 2 Average quoted interest rate spreads on
household loans
(a) Spreads are taken over Bank Rate.
(b) Spreads are taken over two-year swaps.
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Chart 3 Floating-rate mortgage spreads and product
availability across loan to value ratios(a)
Sources:  Moneyfacts Group and Bank calculations.
(a) End-month advertised rates for products with different LTV ratios.  Size of bubble reflects the
number of products.  The spread is calculated over Bank Rate at the end-month for the
relevant period.
Table A Decomposition of new lending rates(a)
Differences from 2004–07 averages (percentage points)
2008 2009 2010(b)
Mortgage spread(c) 0.8 2.7 2.5
of which:
Funding cost 1.6 1.5 1.2
Credit risk factors -0.1 0.0 0.0
Residual -0.8 1.2 1.4
Unsecured loan spread(d) 1.3 5.7 6.8
of which:
Funding cost 0.9 1.2 1.3
Credit risk factors -0.1 0.4 0.5
Residual 0.5 4.2 5.0
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Council of Mortgage Lenders, Markit Group
Limited, UK Cards Association and Bank calculations.  
(a) For details on the data and method used in the decompositions, see Button et al (2010).  As discussed in that
article, the marginal source of funding, and the way in which lenders set their loan rates, may vary across
different institutions.  So while this decomposition is likely to be useful in understanding loan pricing in
aggregate, the experience of individual lenders may vary.  Contributions may not sum to the total due to
rounding.  
(b) Data are an estimate based on data to October 2010.
(c) 75% LTV tracker mortgage average quoted rate relative to Bank Rate.  The funding cost is shown as a spread
relative to Bank Rate.
(d) £10,000 personal loan average quoted rate relative to two-year swaps.  The funding cost is shown as a
spread relative to two-year swaps.Research and analysis Understanding the weakness of bank lending 315
effective rates are likely to underestimate the rates at which
companies are able to arrange genuinely new loans from banks
in practice. 
Indicative data on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), available from late 2008 onwards, point to a rise in
interest rate spreads for some borrowers.  According to data
from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,
margins over the banks’ own base rates for SMEs who applied
for overdrafts in 2008 were significantly higher than they had
been in earlier years.
Another indicator of the cost of finance is spreads on new
syndicated loans — large loans provided by a group of banks or
other lenders.(1) Syndicated loan spreads increased sharply
from mid-2008, with investment-grade spreads rising to a
peak of over 300 basis points (Chart 4).  But these spreads are
based on a small number of deals, as the flow of syndicated
lending to UK businesses declined sharply from its peak in 
mid-2007.  More recently, investment-grade spreads have
fallen back, although sub-investment grade spreads remain
elevated.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which increased spreads on
corporate loans reflect tighter credit supply.  Although an
equivalent decomposition of loan pricing as discussed for new
household borrowing is not available, it is likely that increased
funding costs would also have pushed up the cost of corporate
lending.  So it is likely that at least part of the estimated rise in
SME spreads and syndicated loan spreads reflects tighter credit
supply.
An indicator of credit availability is the amount of agreed
lending facilities outstanding, and the utilisation rates of those
facilities.  The outstanding stock of facilities (excluding
facilities advanced to the real estate sector)(2)fell sharply from
mid-2008.  And utilisation rates rose from mid-2007 to early
2009 as companies made more intensive use of their 
already-agreed facilities, but utilisation rates have since fallen
back (Chart 5). 
Utilisation data suffer from the same identification issues as
other indicators of credit demand and supply, however.  Low
utilisation rates might suggest weak demand for credit relative
to supply.  But low utilisation rates may also reflect the
response of demand to higher lending spreads and more
stringent terms and conditions on new facilities.  Furthermore,
concerns among businesses that existing facilities might be
withdrawn, or become more expensive in the future, would
lead them to reduce their reliance on bank credit before those
facilities expire.  As a result, low utilisation rates need not
necessarily imply weak demand for credit.  Similarly, if 
lower-quality borrowers are put off applying for credit by the
high cost of borrowing, consistent with low numbers of loan
applications, that might boost approval rates.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the cost of credit rose
sharply during the financial crisis, and that there was a
reduction in the availability of credit, both for households and
companies.  For households, the available evidence points to
an increase in credit spreads controlling for changes in credit
quality, consistent with a significant role for tighter credit
supply in explaining the weakness of bank lending.  The
evidence for corporate lending is less clear-cut, but it is likely
that tight credit supply played a role in driving up the cost of
credit.
(1) See the box on page 8 of the July 2010 Trends in Lendingfor a discussion of recent
trends in syndicated lending.
(2) The relationship between agreed facilities and lending in the real estate sector has
different aggregate dynamics to that in other sectors.  See the box on page 7 of the













Chart 4 Spreads reported on syndicated loans(a)
Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a) Average disclosed spreads over reference rates in the currency in which loan tranches are
denominated, weighted by tranche size.  Investment grade is classified by Dealogic as a rating
of BBB- or higher, with the classification adjusted where ratings change over the life of the
loan.  If there is no rating, then the loan spread on origination is used as the basis for
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Chart 5 PNFCs’ agreed facilities, lending and utilisation
rate(a)
(a) Private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) excluding commercial real estate.  The data are
quarterly prior to 2009 Q3 and monthly thereafter.
(b) The utilisation rate is the amount of lending divided by the amount of facilities agreed.316 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
Evidence from the lenders 
Evidence from the lenders suggests that price and non-price
terms on loans rose during the financial crisis.  Lenders
responding to the Bank’s Credit Conditions Survey reported that
spreads increased markedly across all types of lending,
particularly during 2008 and early 2009.  The net percentage
balances of lenders reporting increased fees on secured lending
and fees/commissions on loans to companies also rose.
According to the Credit Conditions Survey, the availability of
secured lending to households contracted markedly during
2007–08, and has remained tight (Chart 6 shows responses on
changes in credit availability and the factors contributing to
that).  A net balance of lenders reported that tightening in part
reflected economic conditions.  That would be consistent with
reduced availability to compensate for a deterioration in the
quality of potential borrowers, rather than suggesting either a
fall in demand or a tightening in supply.  But lenders also
reported a significant role for market share objectives,
changing appetite for risk and changing cost/availability of
funds.  These three factors may be thought of as credit supply
factors, suggesting that there was an independent tightening
in the supply of secured credit during the financial crisis.  A
similar picture was reported for both corporate lending and
unsecured lending to households during the worst of the
recession, although lenders have reported some easing in
corporate credit conditions over the past 18 months.
Lenders responding to the Credit Conditions Surveys indicated
that demand for credit has fallen on average since 2007 H2 for
most borrowers, with demand holding up only for small
businesses (Table B).  That is consistent with the findings
reported by the Business Finance Taskforce.(1) But, as discussed
above, lenders only see demand for credit given the rates that
they are charging, or given the availability of products.  And
they are unlikely to be able to tell whether the weakness in
demand was caused by earlier tightening of credit supply or by
independent factors.  Indeed, given that the weakening in
demand was accompanied by an increase in reported spreads
and non-price terms on lending, weak credit demand is more
likely to reflect the tightening in credit supply than
independent factors.  
Overall, the evidence from the lenders points to a tightening in
the supply of credit during the financial crisis, although
conditions for large companies have improved over the past
year or so and conditions for other borrowers appear to have
stabilised.  Lenders also reported a weakening in demand for
credit during the financial crisis, but in part that is likely to
reflect the effect of the tightening in credit supply.
Evidence from the Bank’s Agents and survey data
Survey evidence and reports to the Bank’s Agents point to a
tightening in bank credit conditions for businesses during the
financial crisis.  Respondents to the Deloitte Chief Financial
Officer surveys indicated that bank credit became increasingly
unattractive during 2007–08, although it has become more
attractive since then (Chart 7).  Evidence from contacts of the
Bank’s Agents and various business surveys points to a sharp
drop in the perceived availability of credit to SMEs in 2007–08,
and higher rates relative to Bank Rate or Libor.(2) That initial
tightening appeared to be sharper than for larger companies,
and in recent months conditions are reported to have
improved by less, if at all, for SMEs.
Reports from the Bank’s Agents suggest that, in part, the rise in
spreads and reduction in availability reflected increased risk.
Some regional banking contacts described themselves to the
Bank’s Agents as frustrated by the lack of demand from 
(1) See ‘Supporting UK business, the report of the Business Finance Taskforce’, available at
www.bba.org.uk/media/article/business-finance-taskforce.
(2) See the box on pages 7–8 of the October 2010 Trends in Lendingfor further details on
lending to SMEs, and the box on pages 30–31 of the February 2010 Inflation Reportfor
a discussion of how SMEs have been affected during the recession.
Table B Credit Conditions Survey:  demand for credit(a)
Net percentage balances
Averages(b)
Since 2007 H2 2009  2010 H1  2010 Q3
Large PNFCs -16 -17 -4 -2
Medium PNFCs -11 -11 6 -4
Small business borrowing
Secured 0 4 19 -14
Unsecured 7 10 21 12
Households
Secured -4 19 -15 -6
Unsecured -8 -19 -6 -12
(a) Weighted response of lenders.  A positive balance indicates higher demand for credit over the past 
three months.
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Chart 6 Credit Conditions Survey:  change in availability
and factors contributing to change in availability of
secured loans to households(a)
(a) Weighted response of lenders.  A positive balance indicates looser credit availability or
factors increasing the availability of credit over the past three months.Research and analysis Understanding the weakness of bank lending 317
‘good-quality’ propositions, even as companies reported that
they had seen the terms of their borrowing tighten.  That
suggests that lenders saw some companies unable to access
finance as too risky.  
Survey evidence suggests that deteriorating credit quality can
only in part explain increased spreads and reduced availability,
however.  Using responses from the UK survey of SME finances,
Fraser (2009) found that the businesses with the most
difficulty in obtaining bank credit tended to be higher-risk
companies.  But he also found that loan rejections increased in
2008 compared with the 2005–08 period, even having
attempted to control for the riskiness of borrowing SMEs.
Reports from the Bank’s Agents and survey evidence suggest
that demand for finance weakened markedly during the
recession.  A survey conducted by the Bank’s Agents in late
2009 concluded that, on balance, the weakness in economic
activity was the prime factor accounting for the fall in
investment during the recession, rather than tighter credit
supply.  And despite recent improvements in credit conditions
for some businesses, reports from the Bank’s Agents are
consistent with only a gentle recovery in investment rather
than robust growth.
Overall, evidence from surveys and the Bank’s Agents suggests
a role for both tight credit supply and subdued credit demand
in the weakness of bank lending to companies.  Such evidence
can provide little steer, however, in quantifying the relative
contribution of changes in demand and supply.
Evidence from non-bank sources of finance 
Developments in non-bank finance may provide indirect
evidence of changes in demand for bank loans.  If households
and companies reduce their borrowing from banks and switch
to another source of finance, the resulting weakness in bank
lending is more likely to reflect tighter credit supply than
weaker demand.
For households, there are few alternative sources of finance.
Probably reflecting that, the contraction in lending to the
household sector since mid-2007 has been broadly matched
by a higher household saving ratio as households have reduced
spending relative to disposable income.  
By contrast, some businesses — particularly large companies
— can raise finance by issuing equities or debt, including
corporate bonds and commercial paper, although these are
unlikely to be perfect substitutes for bank borrowing.  The
decline in bank lending to companies since early 2008 has
been associated with less negative flows of other types of
finance alongside a rise in financial saving (Chart 8).  Indeed,
PNFCs’ net equity and bond issuance was considerably higher
in 2009 than its 2003–08 average, although it has fallen back
to around average so far in 2010.  That suggests that demand
for finance held up for those companies raising capital market
finance.
That is borne out by company-level evidence of switching
away from bank loans towards bond finance during the
financial crisis.  To assess this, we construct a panel of large 
UK PNFCs that have raised finance using bond markets from
1990–2009 for which data on total long-term borrowing as
well as bond issuance are readily available.(1) In each year, the
share of total borrowing by those companies accounted for by
bond issuance is calculated.  Preliminary results suggest a
marked shift towards bond finance since 2007 (Chart 9).  That
is consistent with a tightening in the supply of non-bond
finance.  These findings are broadly consistent with US
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Chart 7 Survey measures of the attractiveness of
different sources of finance
Source:  The Deloitte CFO Survey 2010 Q3.
(a) Net percentage balances are calculated as the percentage of respondents who thought that




















Chart 8 PNFCs’ financial transactions(a)
(a) The latest observation is 2010 Q3 for new bank loans and 2010 Q2 for the remaining series.
(b) The recession is defined as at least two consecutive quarters of falling output (at constant
market prices) estimated using the latest data.  The recession is assumed to end once output
began to rise.
(c) Sterling and foreign currency loans to PNFCs.
(d) Calculated as a residual:  the sum of the financial balance, new bank loans and net other
finance is equal to zero.318 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
company-level evidence discussed in Becker and Ivashina
(2010).  And in 2010 there has been an increase in the number
of UK PNFCs accessing the corporate bond market for the first
time.
Developments in the cost of non-bank finance may also
provide information about the cost of bank loans.  For
example, because some large companies can choose between
issuing corporate bonds and taking out a loan, their respective
prices should be influenced by each other.  Corporate bond
spreads (relative to gilts) for UK investment-grade PNFCs rose
sharply in 2008 and peaked around the start of 2009 
(Chart 10).  That rise may underestimate the increase in
spreads on bank loans:  reports from the major lenders suggest
that some PNFCs repaid bank loans using the proceeds of
capital market issuance, suggesting that those loans were
more expensive than bond finance.  
It is possible to use an econometric approach to assess the
extent to which increases in corporate bond spreads reflect
tight credit supply relative to changes in credit risk.(1) The
analysis assumes that any systematic variation in corporate
bond spreads for individual companies that is unrelated to
changes in their equity price and macroeconomic indicators
reflects changes in credit supply.(2) Stripping out these factors
is assumed to control for changes in both company-specific
risk (through the company’s equity price) and changes in
economy-wide risk (through the macroeconomic variables).
Preliminary analysis using this approach suggests that tighter
credit supply accounted for the bulk of the rise in corporate
bond spreads between August 2007 and early 2009, although
it has become less important since then.  Even after controlling
for credit quality, supply conditions appear to have tightened
by more for high-risk borrowers.
Overall, evidence from both volumes and prices of non-bank
finance suggest a role for both tight credit supply and weak
credit demand.  But tighter credit supply is likely to have been
a somewhat more important driver of weak bank lending than
independently low demand.
Econometric identification of credit supply shocks
Another way to identify the impact of changes in credit
demand and credit supply on lending is to use an econometric
identification scheme.  One such approach is to estimate a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR), and identify shocks 
to credit supply.(3) The intuition for this approach, following
from the simple demand and supply diagrams discussed above,
is that a credit supply shock is associated with both a
reduction in the quantity of lending and an increase in spreads.
Such a credit supply shock would be associated with a
reduction in the demand for credit as spreads increased, but
that would be in response to tighter credit supply rather than
an independent credit demand shock.  The model estimates
the extent to which such shocks have been observed
historically.  The box on page 319 describes the SVAR approach
in more detail.  
The results of the SVAR suggest that the credit supply shock
may account for a large part of the slowdown in annual real
bank lending growth (Table C).  So far in 2010, however, other
factors have also become important.  Given the lags included
in the estimation, the contributions from the different factors
reflect both shocks occurring in each period and lagged
responses to previous shocks.  The estimates are highly
uncertain.  For example, although the estimates based on the
mean parameters suggest that credit supply shocks detracted 
(1) The analysis follows the method proposed by Gilchrist et al (2009), and was carried
out by Giuseppe Vera.
(2) This identification strategy is likely to provide a lower bound for the impact of the
credit shock, as any contemporaneous impact of credit supply shocks on equity
returns or the macroeconomy will be attributed to increases in credit risk.













Chart 10 UK PNFC corporate bond spreads by rating(a)
Sources:  Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations. 
(a) Average option-adjusted spreads between sterling corporate bond yields and government
bond yields of corresponding maturity.  Monthly averages of daily data.  The latest
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Chart 9 Share of bonds in total borrowing for businesses
with demand for credit(a)
Sources:  Dealogic, Thomson Reuters Worldscope company accounts database and 
Bank calculations.
(a) Data are based on a panel of 97 UK PNFCs for which equity is listed in the United Kingdom
and that have issued at least one corporate bond between 1990 and 2009.  For each year, we
then select only those companies that raised long-term finance (as per the financial
statement variable ‘long-term borrowing’, which is defined as borrowing with maturity over
one year).  The chart shows the proportion of long-term borrowing accounted for by
corporate bonds, averaged across the sample of companies.Research and analysis Understanding the weakness of bank lending 319
from real lending growth in 2008, a plausible range around the
parameters in the model results in a decomposition that
encompasses a boost from credit supply factors in 2008 
(Table C).  In 2009 and 2010 H1, however, the whole range
suggests a negative credit supply shock.
The results are broadly consistent with recent preliminary
work by Bassett et al (2010) for the United States.  That uses
individual lenders’ responses to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion
Survey to construct a measure of credit supply controlling for
changes in credit risk and demand.  It then uses a similar
system of econometric equations to the SVAR discussed
above, and finds that tighter credit supply during the crisis was
associated with a large reduction in core lending capacity in
the United States.
Conclusion
Bank lending to UK households and businesses weakened
sharply following the start of the global financial crisis in 
mid-2007.  While it is difficult to disentangle the factors
driving weak bank lending, the evidence discussed in this
article suggests a significant role for a persistent tightening in
the supply of credit, independent of changes in credit quality
and Bank Rate.  In part, that is likely to have been a reaction to
the unusually loose conditions that existed immediately prior
to the crisis.  Credit demand is also likely to have weakened
during the recession, weighing on bank lending.  That is
consistent with reports from the Bank’s Agents.  
Overall, the analysis in this article suggests that the weakness
in bank lending since mid-2007 reflects a combination of
tighter credit supply and weaker credit demand.  Qualitatively,
tight credit supply is likely to have been the dominant
influence.  For example, independently weak demand would
typically be associated with lower spreads on loans, rather
than higher spreads.  And it is not consistent with the switch
into capital market issuance by some PNFCs during the
financial crisis.  But it is difficult to assess the relative
contribution of demand and supply more precisely.
While there is some evidence that credit supply conditions
have improved somewhat since the peak of the financial crisis,
especially for large companies with access to capital markets,
constrained credit supply continues to be one of the main
factors holding back the economic recovery.  The Bank will
continue to monitor developments in bank lending and the
banking sector closely.




2008 2009 2010  H1
Credit supply shocks -1.4  (-3 to 4)  -8.3  (-9 to -4)  -6.1  (-7 to -2)
Other shocks -0.6  (-5 to 1)  1.8  (-2 to 2)  -2.6 (-6 to -2)
Trend 5.8  (5 to 6)  5.8  (5 to 6)  5.8  (5 to 6)
Lending(b) (per cent) 3.8  -0.7  -3.0
Sources:  Bank of England, ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) For details of the model behind this decomposition, see the box above.  The latest observations are 2010 Q2.
The model is estimated using data from 1966 Q4–2010 Q2.  Averages of quarterly data.  Figures in
parentheses are estimates of the uncertainty surrounding the contributions to lending from the various
factors.  They are based on estimating the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution around the
parameters of the model (these percentiles are commonly chosen in econometric analysis).
(b) The series is constructed as M4 lending (excluding securitisations) growth prior to 1998 Q4 and the
equivalent measure excluding borrowing by intermediate other financial corporations thereafter.  The series
is deflated using seasonally adjusted CPI data.
Estimating the contribution of credit supply
using a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR)
The SVAR approach involves estimating a set of equations,
where each variable is regressed on past movements of itself
and the other variables in the system.  The SVAR includes
standard macroeconomic variables — CPI inflation, GDP
growth and Bank Rate — and a number of credit and financial
market variables — M4 lending (adjusted for the effects of
securitisations and lending to intermediate other financial
corporations), investment-grade corporate bond spreads (as a
general proxy for credit spreads) and equity prices.  One
disadvantage of this SVAR approach is that it is based on the
empirical relationship between a small number of
macroeconomic variables, and may provide a misleading
description of a more complicated reality.
Using these equations, each variable can be decomposed into
a component that is ‘explained’ by its own past outturns and
those of other variables in the model, and an ‘unexplained’
residual.  The unexplained component of each variable is then
decomposed into the impact of different fundamental, or
‘structural’, shocks.
The shocks used in the SVAR are identified according to
assumptions about how they are likely to affect the variables
included in the model.  For example, a credit supply shock is
defined as one that is associated with weak lending and high
credit spreads.  The remaining shocks identified in the model
can all be thought of as affecting demand for credit.  For
example, an ‘aggregate demand’ shock, which is identified as
moving inflation and GDP in the same direction, would also be
expected to affect credit demand.  It is difficult to identify
shocks separately in this way, as it requires a number of
assumptions about the direction and timing of the impact of
each shock.  The results are preliminary and should be
interpreted with caution.320 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q4
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